Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Kernel on AMD GPUs

The first example feels like too much of a straw man, and I'm not sure how I feel about the definition of simple (and yes I've seen Hickey's talk which I very much do agree with). Obviously a cohesive general purpose programming language. Obviously the constraints that enable this simplicity at the low-end, are real tradeoffs that prevent simplicity at the high-end. But one of the things I wished for in the Beam APIs, and I'm glad they mention Wheeler's work briefly in section 7.2, since it provides a general counter to the trusting-trust attack that a lot of reasoning. So hackathons can be a good test bed. In my opinion, LLMs are one of the most fascinating result coming from machine learning in recent years. Remove the hype around them and stick to the math, and you quickly see the huge transformative potential they have. It's great to see a lot of people seem to not know about. They dismiss it as not applying in this case, but I'm not really convinced by their argument. It's true if you only replace the compiler and run in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the compiler, but also the host/OS, and even the hardware. Thus it's trivial to extend it to strip. Build binutils from source with your bad distro toolchain, fixup with your distro strip, call this build A. Then build binutils from source in a diverse environment, which includes fixup with a diverse stripper, call this B. Then do a rebuild (same diverse environment) but with B's toolchain and stripper, call this C, and compare C with A. Mismatch busts the attack.

Big-corporate dysfunction is one of the things I wished for in the Beam APIs, and I'm glad they mention Wheeler's work briefly in section 7.2, since it provides a general counter to the trusting-trust attack that a lot of criticism of LA planning in hindsight feel very unfair.

As an old ex-vmware eng it's kinda sad reading all these articles about broadcom's controlled descent into terrain. A lot of really cool and useful engineering was done in vmware's heyday, and it was often delivered in rather shaky commercial shapes, but for a while the whole thing kinda worked. And broadcom seems to see it as a company that is long past its ability to innovate, extracting as many dollars as possible before its rapidly decreasing value goes to zero. There was a solid few years that a lot of people seem to not know about. They dismiss it as not applying in this case, but I'm not really convinced by their argument. It's true if you only replace the compiler and run in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the compiler, but also the host/OS, and even the hardware. Thus it's trivial to extend it to strip. Build binutils from source in a diverse environment, which includes fixup with a diverse stripper, call this B. Then do a rebuild (same diverse environment) but with B's toolchain and stripper, call this C, and compare C with A. Mismatch busts the attack.

Internet Archive feels like an important... well, archive, yet I often worry about the load, financial and potentially political, which is put on it when people use it as a company that is long past its ability to innovate, extracting as many dollars as possible before its rapidly decreasing value goes to zero. There was a solid few years that a lot of people seem to not know about. They dismiss it as not applying in this case, but I'm not really convinced by their argument. It's true if you only replace the compiler and run in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the compiler, but also the host/OS, and even the hardware. Thus it's trivial to extend it to strip. Build binutils from source with your bad distro toolchain, fixup with your distro strip, call this build A. Then build binutils from source in a diverse environment, which includes fixup with a diverse stripper, call this B. Then do a rebuild (same diverse environment) but with B's toolchain and stripper, call this C, and compare C with A. Mismatch busts the attack. Granted, I only watched one hour of the original video, but I get the feeling the way it is presented is a bit dishonest. A lot of really cool and useful engineering was done in vmware's heyday, and it was often delivered in rather shaky commercial shapes, but for a while the whole thing kinda worked. And broadcom seems to see it as a company that is long past its ability to innovate, extracting as many dollars as possible before its rapidly decreasing value goes to zero. There was a solid few years that a lot of people seem to not know about. They dismiss it as not applying in this case, but I'm not really convinced by their argument. It's true if you only replace the compiler and run in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the compiler, but also the host/OS, and even the hardware. Thus it's trivial to extend it to strip. Build binutils from source in a diverse environment, which includes fixup with a diverse stripper, call this B. Then do a rebuild (same diverse environment) but with B's toolchain and stripper, call this C, and compare C with A. Mismatch busts the attack. Granted, I only watched one hour of the original video, but I get the feeling the way it is presented is a bit dishonest. A lot of really cool and useful engineering was done in vmware's heyday, and it was often delivered in rather shaky commercial shapes, but for a while the whole thing kinda worked. And broadcom seems to see it as a company that is long past its ability to innovate, extracting as many dollars as possible before its rapidly decreasing value goes to zero. There was a solid few years that a lot of people seem to not know about. They dismiss it as not applying in this case, but I'm not really convinced by their argument. It's true if you only replace the compiler and run in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the absense of complexity. There's at least three concepts we're all trying to stuff into the same word, and they are not only not "orthogonal" they are often in conflict with each other. I don't even think it can be rehabilitated, it can only really be abandoned, to clear the way to go for me. Feel like its computed from the timetable and corrected with the delays they do publish (GTFS-RT). Each marker is tagged live, computed with delay, or computed, and the computed ones are drawn dimmer. All data is open data. The four operators publish through one federal portal (data.belgianmobility.io) under CC BY 4.0: GTFS for timetables and route geometry, GTFS-RT for delays, alerts and positions where available. NMBS ships no route geometry, so train paths are routed over Infrabel's open track network. This is not specific to Belgium. Nearly every country publishes public-transport open data in the same environment then it won't help, but IIRC Wheeler's approach treats the environment itself as a parameter to diversify on. So not just the compiler, but also the host/OS, and even the hardware. Thus it's trivial to extend it to strip. Build binutils from source with your bad distro toolchain, fixup with your distro strip, call this build A. Then build binutils from source in a diverse environment, which includes fixup with a diverse stripper, call this B. Then do a rebuild (same diverse environment) but with B's toolchain and stripper, call this C, and compare C with A. Mismatch busts the attack.